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Euroscepticism and Opposition to
British Entry into the EEC, 1955-75





1 The 2016 debate leading up to the referendum in which the British people were asked to
decide on their country’s future inside or outside the EU revolved around a series of
issues many, if  not most,  of which had been the subject of heated discussion for the
previous fifty years. Nor was the 2016 referendum the first of its kind as much the same
questions had been asked of a previous generation some forty years earlier.  It  seems
unlikely that the vote in favour of leaving the EU, however clear this appeared to be, will
close the debate. As events since June 2016 have shown, there remains a great deal of
uncertainty as to what the future holds for Britain and for its relationship with the rest of
Europe and with the EU as an institution.
2 The  strength  of  Eurosceptical  opposition  to  the  European  project,  and  to  Britain’s
participation  in  it,  has  varied  considerably  over  the  course  of  the  past  fifty  years,
although  more  recently  its  importance  has  undoubtedly  grown  as  has  its  ability  to
influence, decisively in June 2016, the political debate and decision makers. Rather than
trace the growth of this movement and its political impact the present article will seek to
consider the fundamental arguments on which this Euroscepticism, in all its different
forms, has been based. The underlying theme, therefore, is to see how present-day anti-
European sentiment, as expressed via UKIP, parts of the Conservative party or from a left-
wing perspective, can be traced back to the earliest years of European construction. It will
seek to show that many of the arguments used by the “leave” campaigners, and many of
the deep-rooted Europhobe sentiments underlying them, are similar to those used in
previous years. In this way the 2016 referendum can be seen as the latest example of a
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long-standing and persistent British Euroscepticism which needs to be traced back to the
immediate post-war years and whose roots are to be found across the political spectrum
and not solely in the Conservative Party at the time of the Maastricht Treaty.1
 
Euroscepticism: Some Origins and Definitions
3 If the ideas that lie behind Euroscepticism are far older, the use of the term itself cannot
be traced back beyond the mid-1980s and is nowhere to be found in the post-war debate
on  Britain’s  relations  with  the  rest  of  Europe.  From the  Treaty  of  Rome  up  to  and
including the 1975 referendum, the term ‘anti-Marketeer’ was the most widely found,
although this was not always used precisely. Indeed, the expression ‘Common Market’
was  in  itself  something  of  a  misnomer.  Equally,  both  ‘Euroscepticism’  and  ‘anti-
Marketeer’ have been the subject of varying interpretations and usages, especially in the
popular media.2 Similar questions of definition also need to be asked about the exact
meaning of ‘Europe’. Precisely which of the many versions of ‘Europe’ is being opposed
and criticised? This lack of a clearly defined idea of what Europe is or should be, and
therefore  of  what  Euroscepticism  is,  was  evident  from  the  outset  of  the  debate  on
Britain’s relations with the emerging European institutions after 1945. Europe has rarely
been condemned in all its meanings, in a simply Europhobic sense. Instead, more often
than not, it is ‘the wrong sort of Europe’ that is being attacked. Europe has taken on
different  meanings.  Equally,  the  European  institutions  have  never  stood  still  and
European integration or construction needs to be seen as an ongoing process that can
take  different  directions.  The  Europe  of  the  EU  today,  in  many  ways,  bears  little
resemblance to the Europe of the European Coal and Steel and Community (ECSC) first
put  forward in  1950;  nor  does  the Europe of  the  Euro Zone and the Schengen Area
compare to De Gaulle’s vision of a Europe des patries or to that proposed by Britain in the
late 1950s in its Free Trade Area (FTA) scheme.
4 Defining the historical expressions of British Euroscepticism, and seeking to understand
its origins and ideological bases, is not, therefore, easy. Tony Benn, one of the leading
anti-marketeers of his generation, was keen to emphasise what he saw as the important
distinction between the opponents of the EEC and anti-Europeans. “I was born a European
and I will die one”, he argued. But, he went on, “I have never put my alliance behind the treaty
of Rome. I object to it. I hate being called an anti-European. How can one be anti-European when
one is born in Europe?... What a lot of nonsense it  is.”3 Enoch Powell made much the same
argument regarding his own position. While it has often been possible to portray some
Eurosceptics  as  ‘Little  Englanders’  and  xenophobes,  others  have  been  critical  of  the
various European bodies on the ground that they are insufficiently international, that
they have sought to adopt a narrowly European perspective as opposed to a truly global
one.
 
Britain, Europe and the World: Distance,
Exceptionalism, Superiority?
5 When considering the opposition of many people in Britain to Europe and to European
integration after 1945 it is commonplace to point to various fundamental differences that
have reinforced the sense of separation between Britain and its continental neighbours.
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Just  how  far  British  ‘exceptionalism’  is  a  reality  is  debatable.  Indeed,  ‘is  Britain
European?’ is perhaps the most fundamental question, one that has been at the heart of
the debate around Britain’s relations with the rest of Europe for the past half century. For
numerous Eurosceptics the answer has either been ‘no’, or at least not European in the
sense of the EEC-EU.
6 Numerous accounts have traced the origins of Britain’s distanced attitude towards the
rest  of  the  continent  back  to  the  Roman  Empire,  the  Hundred  Years’  War,  to  the
Reformation and Henry VIII’s break with Rome, and the ‘Glorious Revolution’.  In this
vision  Britain’s  adoption  of  a  constitutional  monarchy  set  it  in  opposition  to  the
absolutist regimes elsewhere in Europe. In some ways the very creation of the British
state left behind a legacy of Euroscepticism. English, and then British, nationalism, like all
other  forms  of  nationalism,  was  necessarily  based  on  a  sense  of  difference  and  of
separation from an ‘Other’, from other neighbouring, and often rival, nationalisms. For
most of English or British history this ‘Other’ could only have been European. This sense
of differentiation was reinforced by the long record of Britain’s opposition to continental
tyranny in the form of Philip II, Louis XIV, Napoleon or the Kaiser. However doubtful such
an interpretation of Britain’s past relations with the rest of Europe may be today, for past
generations,  up to and including those of  the 1940s and 1950s,  this  image of  British
liberties being defended against the threat from the Continent was deeply rooted at all
levels of British society. These accounts were part of a broadly Whig interpretation of
British history that can be taken back to Thomas Babington Macaulay in the 1840s and
which continued to  exercise  a  significant  influence,  as  did  the  later  similar  popular
histories of such historians as H.A.L Fisher4 and G. M. Trevelyan5, in the 1920s and 1930s.
For  the  generation  of  post-war  leaders,  and  for  the  country  as  a  whole,  the  more
immediate memories  of  British resistance against  the threats  of  Fascism and Nazism
significantly reinforced this sense of mistrust of Continental Europe.
7 Another aspect of Britain’s apparent exceptionalism that has often been pointed to is the
British sense of pragmatism and empiricism and the contrast with the more ideological
and  theoretical  approach  of  many  on  the  Continent.  The  distinction  between  the
generally uncodified British common law, and Britain’s unwritten constitution, and the
continental tradition of civil law has also been looked to as an explanation of this Anglo-
Continental divide.6 The presentation of the European project in the 1950s, and later, in
such theoretical and legalistic terms reinforced the reluctance of most British people to
be  part  of  them.  Britain’s  first  post-war  Foreign  Secretary,  Ernest  Bevin,  explained
Britain’s refusal to be part of the ECSC by arguing that “Once you open that Pandora’s box all
sorts of Trojan Horses will fly out.”7 What for him appeared to be the abstract and unrealistic
thinking behind the project had little appeal. Many other Britons took a similar view.
Enoch Powell similarly pointed to the fact that four of the six initial member states of the
EEC were recent creations in European history and that all of them had recently created
constitutions  and  assemblies  which,  he  argued,  made  them  more  amenable  to  the
creation of another new, European, political structure.
8 Many observers of Britain’s relations with Europe, on both sides of the Channel, have
often pointed to the fundamental fact that Britain is an island in order to get to what they
see as the roots of this divide. De Gaulle’s veto of the first British application to enter the
EEC in January 1963 was in large part justified by repeated references to Britain’s insular
and maritime status. Britain, he said, was simply not European enough and had “in all her
doings very marked and very original habits and traditions. In short, the nature, the structure, the
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very situation that are England’s differ profoundly from those of the continentals.”8 There were
many on the other side of the Channel who agreed with his analysis. In 1951 the Labour
Party pamphlet ‘European Unity’ had argued that “in every respect except distance, we in
Britain are closer to our kinsmen in Australia and New Zealand on the far side of the world, than
we are to Europe”.9 For Enoch Powell the physical Anglo-Continental divide had lost none
of its significance for Britain’s national identity even in the nuclear age.
9 That Britain is linked not only to the rest of Europe, which even the most strident of
Europhobes have had to recognise, however reluctantly, but also to the wider world is
another  factor  that  has  been  emphasised  by  observers  and  historians  of  the  Anglo-
Continental relationship. Churchill’s 1948 ‘three circles’ theory retained its relevance for
all British leaders throughout the 1940s, 50s and 60s. While they recognised that Britain
could not afford to cut itself off from Europe none of them were prepared in any way to
give up Britain’s world role or to see Britain as anything other than a global, and not just
a regional, player. All this inevitably fed into a distanced attitude towards Europe and the
British sense of superiority over the continental Europeans. In turn this was a central
aspect of the country’s Euroscepticism.
10 Anti-European attitudes, the denigration of old enemies and even of present-day allies,
and a simple lack of belief in the European projects, contrasted sharply with the general
British attitudes towards the rest of  the world,  at least towards the English-speaking
world in the Commonwealth and the United States. For many in Britain the idea that
these parts of the world were populated by their ‘kith and kin’ was still  strongly felt
especially when compared to the essentially foreign continentals. Many Britons felt far
more at home in their dealings with those parts of the world they knew best, the old
Dominions and the United States, than with Europe. One opinion poll showed in 1966 that
when asked to rate the countries they most trusted, Australia came out on top, followed
by Sweden, the United States and India with Germany and France only fractionally above
the USSR.10 For so long as this belief that Britain was more naturally part of Churchill’s
‘English-speaking world’ than it was of Europe, and for so long as the country’s decision-
makers felt that they had more attractive alternatives beyond Europe which could best
meet their needs, whether they were economic, commercial, cultural, political, strategic
or in any other field, then they were unlikely to view favourably the moves to construct a
new united and integrated Europe.  Without ever being anti-European,  or  Europhobe,
these  hard-headed,  but  ultimately  short-sighted,  calculations  of  British  interests
encouraged British hesitations with regard to Europe and reinforced its underlying sense
of Euroscepticism.
11 Such sentiments had long been present in much of British thinking. It was, however, the
experience of the Second World War that had the greatest impact on British thinking
towards Europe after 1945. In many ways it continues to play a significant part in the
same debate today. For the British, the story of the War, which the British people have
been  constantly  reminded  of  ever  since  by  the  media  and  in  their  popular  culture,
especially on TV and in film, was one of heroic resistance and final victory. Where the
continental Europeans had collapsed, Britain survived intact. In this vision, Britain was
neither guilty of having turned to Fascism or Nazism, and thereafter of unleashing the
war, nor of the atrocities that accompanied it. Its history was fundamentally different
from that of its initial allies who, through their weakness, had collapsed in the face of this
challenge. Britain was neither an aggressor nor a collaborator. Whereas the countries on
the continent had failed in one way or another, Britain had simply won. For many on the
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Continent,  therefore,  it  was far easier to accept that the nation state as a model for
arranging international affairs had failed and that a new system was required. Britain,
which had not suffered such a shock to its system was, as yet, unwilling to undertake such
a fundamental rethinking. It remained very much wedded to its existing political order
and to the idea, however illusory this was becoming, of its status as a global power. This
later aspect of its self-portrayal was, seemingly, supported by the fact that it remained at
the head of the Empire-Commonwealth and by the ‘special’ relationship it enjoyed with
the United States.
12 Suspicions of  Germany remained strong and when,  by the late 1950s,  West  Germany
appeared  to  be  not  only  challenging  Britain  but  surpassing  it  in  many  areas,  these
feelings were only intensified. In 1958, the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, warned
that “Western Europe dominated in fact by Germany and used as an instrument for the revival of
power through economic means… is really giving them on a plate what we fought two wars to
prevent.”11 One British official similarly warned that the EEC would provide “a means of re-
establishing the hegemony of  Germany”.12 Other anti-German sentiments were of a more
xenophobic nature. In 1960 one Labour MP expressed his disagreement with those of his
colleagues “who feel that Germany is our normal ally and that there is no anti-German prejudice”,
added that “If there is not there ought to be.”13 The denigration of other Europeans, especially
of the French during the years of the Fourth Republic, was equally commonplace. As late
as the 1960s, Clement Attlee told one newspaper “I’m not very keen on the Common Market.
After all, we beat Germany and we beat Italy and we saved France and Belgium and Holland. I
never see why we should go crawling to them”.14 Speaking in the late 1960s he repeated the
same message: “We are asked to join the Six. The Six”, he repeated before concluding in typically
laconic fashion: “I seem to remember that we spent a lot of blood and treasure during the War
rescuing four of them from the other two.”15
 
Opposition to the nascent European project in the
1950s
13 The decision to stand aloof from the moves towards an integrated western European
structure in the 1950s, a decision taken by successive British governments and supported
by an overwhelming majority of the population, was based on a combination of all the
long-established factors given above. This conclusion was reached almost automatically
with little or no discussion. Throwing in Britain’s lot with the rest of Western Europe
hardly seemed an attractive prospect. Nor did it seem to offer the possibility of meeting
the country’s needs. In particular, trade with the countries of the Commonwealth still
seemed  to  offer  the  best  prospects,  although  recent  evolutions  were  beginning  to
undermine this assumption. Perhaps most importantly, attitudes towards Europe, both in
official circles and in the country as a whole, were still heavily tainted by the recent
experiences of war. They stood in stark contrast to the still largely positive vision held of
the Commonwealth and of Britain’s global role.
14 Attlee explained his government’s rejection of the invitation to take part in the ECSC
project when he told the Commons that they were “not prepared to accept the principle that
the most vital economic forces of the country should be handed over to an Authority that is utterly
undemocratic and is responsible to nobody.”16 This was reinforced by the fear that the new
Europe  that  was  emerging  on  the  Continent  would  become  protectionist.  Although
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Britain’s own free trade and laissez-faire credentials were far removed from those of the
classical  economic  liberals  of  the  nineteenth  century,  differences  of  approach  with
Britain’s continental neighbours could still be seen. Where the ‘Six’ were moving towards
a regional, European, customs union, based on a system of regulated trade, exemplified
by the Common Agricultural  Policy,  with a degree of protectionism in the form of a
common external tariff, Britain’s preference was always for a more global, multilateral
and free market approach. The preferred model in London was that of the OEEC and later
the OECD. Britain’s FTA proposal in the late 1950s as an alternative to the EEC stood in
stark contrast to the emerging EEC model. The rejection of the FTA by the Six marked a
first, and important, reversal for the British and their attempts to achieve the ‘right sort
of Europe’.
15 These divergences between Britain and the Six were visible across both major political
parties in Britain. The Labour Party’s traditions and culture made its opposition to the
project to create an integrated and supranational Europe almost inevitable. The origins of
the Labour Party were in many ways quite distinct from those of its sister parties on the
Continent. Its attachment to the Commonwealth was strong and the belief that this new
Europe was being driven by right-wing Christian Democratic parties on the Continent and
that it was, at heart, a capitalist, and perhaps a Catholic, club only served to reinforce the
deeply felt  scepticism among most,  but  not  all,  Labour leaders  and their  supporters.
Although it was under his premiership that the first EEC application was made Macmillan
initially saw the EEC as a serious threat to Britain,  potentially as a renewed form of
Napoleon’s  continental  blockade.  This,  he  warned,  might  start  an  economic  and
commercial war that could become even more serious if left unchecked. This opposition
to the sort of protectionist, and potentially anti-American Europe, envisaged by De Gaulle
was to become a source of serious concern for the British over the next decade. 
 
Opposition to the three EEC applications
16 In the 1950s the idea of Britain joining with the Six as part of the ECSC or the EEC was
unthinkable to the vast majority of the political establishment and to the country as a
whole.  The  rapidly  changing  international  context,  and  the  increasing  doubts  as  to
Britain’s  domestic  situation,  which  brought  about  a  rethinking  of  this  previously
distanced attitude towards European integration and which led, in 1961, to the decision to
open talks  with the  Six  on terms for  British  membership of  the  EEC,  shattered this
comfortable consensus. With the prospect of Britain now actually joining with the other
Europeans in a united Europe the opposition to this move now came to the fore. It was
also at this time that Europe became a dominant issue between and within the political
parties.  At  the  meeting  of  Commonwealth  Heads  of  government  in  September  1962
Gaitskell was making noises to the effect that should they oppose the terms agreed to by
the Conservative government and the Six then they could count on the support of Labour.
Wilson later argued that “If there has to be a choice, we are not entitled to sell our friends and
kinsmen down the river for a problematical and marginal advantage in selling washing machines
in Dusseldorf.”17.  It was, however, Gaitskell’s speech to the Labour Party Conference in
October 1962 that was the clearest expression of Labour opposition to EEC membership.
This  is  rightly  remembered  as  one  of  the  most  fundamental  presentations  of  the
Eurosceptical case which raised fundamental points that “have resonated throughout the
European debate”.18 For Martin Holmes it was a “seminal critique”.19 In this speech Gaitskell
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pulled together a range of different arguments against Britain’s entry to the EEC, many of
which have been central to the debate ever since and which are still in varying forms at
the heart of the present-day debate.
17 His first points took the form of a concrete appraisal of the advantages and disadvantages
for  Britain  of  being  inside  or  outside  the  EEC  and  argued  that  the  Commonwealth
remained essential for Britain’s trade. In particular, he pointed to the danger of food
prices  rising  in  the  event  of  Britain  entering  the  EEC.  Much  was  made  of  this  last
argument in the anti-EEC campaigns throughout the 60s and 70s. The key Eurosceptic
points,  however,  were  not  based  on  economics.  Gaitskell,  in  fact,  accepted  that  the
balance between loss and gain following a British entry to the EEC was unsure. The main
thrust of his argument was political and it is this part of his speech that we find the
essentially Eurosceptic case against British membership of the EEC and where his dire
warnings for the future were most visible. He recognised that Europe “had a great and
glorious  civilisation” and could “claim Goethe  and Leonardo,  Voltaire  and Picasso” but,  he
continued, “there have been evil features in European history, too – Hitler and Mussolini... You
cannot say what this Europe will be: it has its two faces and we do not know as yet which is the one
which will  be  dominant.”  The future development of  Europe was,  therefore,  uncertain;
Europe and the Europeans could still turn one way or another.
18 If the future moral character of Europe was still in doubt, Gaitskell was equally wary of
the EEC’s political ambitions to move towards a “political union”, going beyond a “customs
union” by “stepping towards political  integration” in a “political  federation”.  Gaitskell  also
skilfully  played on the fears  both in his  Party and in the country at  large when he
emphasised,  firstly,  the uncertainty about what Britain was potentially signing up to
should it  enter the EEC and,  secondly,  the need to be sure about this  before Britain
committed itself. His key argument turned to the central issue of the loss of sovereignty
in an integrated Europe. Political federation, he warned, was the clear objective of those
who had created the EEC. In particular, his answer to his rhetorical question “What does
federation mean?” revealed the depth of his opposition to the whole idea:
It  means that powers are taken from national governments and handed over to
federal governments and to federal parliaments. It means – I repeat it – that if we
go into this we are no more than a state (as it were) in the United States of Europe,
such as Texas and California… This is what it means; it does mean the end of Britain
as an independent nation state… the end of Britain as an independent European
state… the end of a thousand years of history… And it does mean the end of the
Commonwealth. How can one really seriously suppose that if the mother country,
the centre of the Commonwealth, is a province of Europe (which is what federation
means) it could continue to exist as the mother country of a series of independent
nations? It is sheer nonsense.20
19 Gaitskell may not have entirely ruled out the idea of Britain entering the EEC should the
right terms be met: maintaining Britain’s position and advantages in the Commonwealth,
safeguarding the interests of the countries of the recently formed European Free Trade
Association, Britain’s right to plan its economy, the maintenance of the system of support
for British farmers and an independent foreign policy, and the refusal to contemplate a
supranational system or to sign up to a commitment to an ‘ever closer union’. However,
there was little doubt of  the Euroscepticism of his message.  Beyond these conditions
Gaitskell  also pointed to the negative impact  of  EEC policies  on the countries of  the
Commonwealth. Already the accusations that the Conservative government was selling
short both Britain and its old friends in the Commonwealth,  and that its assurances,
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promises and pledges could not be trusted, was central to his case. This tendency to use
the  European  debate  to  score  points  over  their  political  adversaries  was  to  be  a
characteristic of the Labour Party’s attitude over the next fifteen years. 
20 Gaitskell also raised another issue that was to become central to the whole Eurosceptic
case in later years: that of popular sovereignty and the ultimate power of the people to
take the final  decision on British entry to the EEC.  Recalling the decision of  Stanley
Baldwin to go to the country over the question of tariff reform in 1923, he warned against
the idea that the government alone was best placed to decide. Even though Macmillan
had not clarified this point, and it remained clear that Parliament would have to give the
final approval for any British entry to the EEC, Gaitskell rounded on the Conservatives:
We are now being told that the British people are not capable of judging this issue –
the Government know best; the top people are the only people who can understand
it; it is too difficult for the rest. This is the classic argument of every tyranny in
history… We did not win the political battles of the 19th and 20th centuries to have
this reactionary nonsense thrust upon us again.
… ‘We must go in,’ they say, ‘not because the power of logic, of fact and conclusion
suggest that it is to our advantage; we must go in because the people who really
understand  it,  the  top  people,  all  want  it.’…  But  what  an  odious  piece  of
hypocritical,  supercilious,  arrogant  rubbish  is  this!...  It  is  all  on  a  par  with  the
argument  of  inevitability.  ‘You  cannot  escape:  you  must  be  with  it.  You  must
belong, no matter to what you belong.’ What a pitiful level of argument we have
reached!21
21 Gaitskell’s conclusion, without coming down definitively against British membership, left
little doubt of his strong Eurosceptic principles. His patriotic call to refuse British entry,
unless the right terms were won from the Six, was that in this case “then we must stand
firm by what we believe, for the sake of Britain, and the Commonwealth and the World; and we
shall not flinch from our duty if that moment comes.”22
22 After Gaitskell’s untimely death a few weeks after this speech, his views were carried on
by various  Labour  campaigning groups  such as  the  ‘Forward Britain Movement’,  the
‘Britain  and  the  Common  Market  Group’,  and  the  ‘Labour  Committee  for  the  Five
Safeguards  on the  Common Market’.  Their  supporters  included Douglas  Jay,  Barbara
Castle,  Emmanuel  Shinwell,  Richard  Crossman,  Peter  Shore,  Denis  Healey  and  Tony
Crosland.  In  1965,  the  then  Labour  Prime  Minister,  Harold  Wilson,  and  his  Foreign
Secretary, Michael Stewart, warned against the way the new Europe was developing. The
danger, as they saw it, was that Europe would evolve into a ‘closed shop’, all the more
worrying as this would be under the leadership of General De Gaulle. Furthermore, what
Wilson termed the “right  sort  of  Europe” had to be “genuinely  outward looking,  and not
autarkic”. If not then it would be “inimical to Atlantic, and more particularly, Commonwealth links
”. As so often throughout the course of the troubled relationship between Britain and the
EEC-EU the question of agriculture and the CAP, and behind this the more fundamental
question of how the EEC-EU was to be financed and Britain’s contribution to this, was the
“real test” for Wilson.23 In one interview with the French leader, Wilson went so far as to
recognise that the EEC, as it then stood, was hardly compatible with the Commonwealth,
the two institutions being fundamentally incompatible, in particular in terms of their
respective  trade  policies.  Paradoxically  it  was  Wilson  who  launched  the  second,
unsuccessful, application to enter the EEC only two years later.
23 While Wilson and Stewart were not outright Eurosceptics their support for British entry
to the EEC was at best conditional and tainted by a large degree of suspicion and doubt
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about the whole European project and, equally significantly, about Britain’s compatibility
with it. As Wilson admitted, he had “never been emotionally a Europe man.”24 One of his
personal advisors thought he was “basically a north of England, non-conformist puritan… The
continental Europeans, especially from France and southern Europe were to him alien. He disliked
their rich food,  genuinely preferring meat and two veg with HP sauce.”25 There were many
others  in  the  Labour  Party  who,  like  Tony  Benn,  “loathe(d)  the  Common  Market”,
condemning  it  unreservedly  as  “bureaucratic  and  centralised”26,  as  a  body  where  the
unelected officials called the shots. The left remained fundamentally opposed to the EEC
on the grounds of the loss of sovereignty that membership would involve. If Britain was
inside  the  EEC,  they  argued,  it  would  be  unable  to  follow  the  socialist  programme,
embodied in the alternative economic strategy, it was supporting at home, particularly
planning  and  state  intervention  in  the  management  of  the  economy  and  trade
protectionism.
24 There was also a degree of internal division in Conservative ranks. Macmillan recognised
that “it was… asking a great deal of the Conservative Party, so long and so intimately linked with
the ideal of Empire, to accept the changed situation”. Following the opening of negotiations
with the Six in 1961 he recorded his concerns in his diary. “There are”, he wrote, “many
very anxious Conservatives. It is getting terribly like 1846” when the Conservative Party was
split for a generation following the repeal of the Corn Laws. His fears extended to the
possible reactions of the British people to his European initiative given their “instinctive
anxiety and even suspicion… about the ambitious plan which the Government was now anxious to
promote”  and  their  “long  tradition  of  isolation  (and)  a  certain  suspicion  of  foreigners.”27
Numerous  leading  Conservative  Eurosceptics  such  as  R.A.  Butler,  Max  Aitken,  Harry
Legge-Bourke and Peter  Walker  continued to express  their  reticence,  and sometimes
outright opposition, to the EEC. The most outspoken Conservative Eurosceptic voice was
that of Enoch Powell who challenged his Party leader, Edward Heath, head on over the
question of Europe from the late sixties onwards. At the 1971 Party Conference, he made a
passionate plea against British entry into the EEC and the loss of sovereignty that this
would entail. However, the Conference voted by 2,474 votes to 324 in favour of British
entry. 
 
The campaign against EEC membership and the 1975
referendum
25 By the time the third,  successful,  application was launched in 1971 the opposition to
British membership of the EEC had become far more organised in both the Labour and the
Conservative Parties. The difficult passage through Parliament of the required legislation
was evidence of the growing strength and widening support for anti-EEC groups. This was
already evident in the Conservative Party ranks during the 1970 election campaign. Most
Conservative candidates chose to avoid mentioning the issue in their campaigns although
it has been estimated that around 10% came out against or expressed major reservations.
In the newly elected Parliament around sixty Conservative MPs could be identified, in
varying degrees, with this group although not all were prepared to openly confront the
Party  leadership  on  this  issue.  Most  significantly,  the  number  of  Conservative  anti-
Marketeers  was  higher  than  the  government’s  overall  majority  thus  giving  them  a
potential influence beyond their numerical strength. The final outcome would, therefore,
depend on the government winning the support of at least a minority of Opposition MPs.
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The vote on the principle of British membership of the EEC in the House of Commons in
October  1971  was  carried  comfortably  but  39  Conservatives  voted  against  the
government’s line and two others abstained. This was more than compensated for by the
sixty-nine  Labour  MPs  who  voted  in  favour.  Later  votes  were,  however,  far  closer,
sometimes being won by fewer than ten votes. This was the first sign of what was later to
become an open breach in the Conservative Party. Importantly, the Conservative anti-
Marketeers were becoming an organised and clearly identifiable group that was able and
willing to challenge Party unity on what they regarded as an issue that went beyond Party
discipline and unity. Although they were unable to block British entry the Eurosceptics
had already seriously undermined the bases on which British membership depended.
Britain’s entry to the EEC on the third attempt in 1973 in no way meant the end to the
Eurosceptics’ campaign.
26 After only two years as a member of the EEC it was, of course, too soon, in 1975, to take
stock of the benefits of Britain’s new position in Europe. There were, however, many
opponents of the EEC who argued that since Britain had ‘joined Europe’ the country’s
economic troubles had only increased. From there to arguing that this was the fault of
Europe was an easy step. Adjustment to the EEC was always going to be difficult and the
economic competition, especially from West Germany, was, as expected, severe. For many
this compared unfavourably with the economic relations Britain had enjoyed with the
Commonwealth. These arguments were reinforced by the fact that at the very moment
that Britain entered the EEC the world economy was thrown into recession. Coming on
top of the breakdown of the post-war international financial and monetary order, this
resulted in unprecedented levels of inflation and a sharp drop in economic growth.
27 The deep divisions within the Labour Party over Europe at the time of the first British
applications to enter the EEC in the 1960s were as nothing to those that emerged in the
following decade. Perhaps more than any other issue that of Europe came to be a decisive
dividing line within Labour ranks. The defeat in the 1970 election, as is so often the case,
led to renewed calls from many within the Labour Party that their whole approach be
reappraised.  Frustration  and  disappointment  among  many  Party  members  that  the
Labour governments of 1964-70 had failed to implement the socialist programme that
they had been elected on produced renewed calls for a more genuinely socialist approach
should  Labour  be  returned  to  office.  This  approach  was  hardly  compatible  with
membership of the EEC. Moreover, the Labour left seized on the question of Europe and of
British membership of the EEC as a stick with which to beat the Party leadership and
which, they hoped, could serve to unite a majority of the Party behind a series of policies
that were both anti-British membership of the EEC and resolutely socialist. In this way
Europe, and the left’s staunch anti-EEC position, became the key issue in the battleground
between the rival Labour factions. Social democrats in the Party such as Roy Jenkins, who
for the most part were in favour of British membership, became the number one targets
for the left’s attacks. In this way the left’s Euroscepticism was directed not only against
the Conservative government’s application in 1971-73 but also against those in their own
Party who supported this approach. Europe was, therefore, a political football not only
between the two parties but, equally importantly, in the ideological battle for dominance
inside the Labour Party.
28 The Conservatives, who have since the late 1970s become the leading exponents of the
Eurosceptic, anti-EEC-EU, message, were up until the mid to late 1970s rightly regarded as
the more pro-European of the two major political parties. So long as the EEC was regarded
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in essentially economic and commercial terms, as above all a trading area, then the vast
majority of Conservatives found little to object to in the EEC. The Conservatives under
Macmillan and Heath had been the driving forces behind the redirection of British policy
towards a  more pro-European stance.  Unlike the Labour Party,  they had not  overtly
sought to make political capital out of their opponents’ European policies and they had
broadly supported Wilson’s  1967 EEC application.  This  should not  be taken to mean,
however,  that  the  Conservative  Party  in  the  60s  and  70s  was  without  any  trace  of
Euroscepticism.  Firstly,  the  first  EEC  application  can  hardly  be  seen  as  proof  of  a
fundamental Euro-enthusiasm. It was characterised rather by its hesitancy and its half-
hearted nature. Macmillan’s application, as many contemporary observers noted, was at
best lukewarm. Nor was it in reality a straightforward request to enter the EEC but rather
an opening of talks with the other Europeans to see if the conditions existed that would
allow Britain to effectively enter the EEC. The negotiations, once they were underway,
soon showed the  extremely  qualified  nature  of  the  British  negotiating  position.  The
scepticism of many in Britain, including many of those in favour of British entry, was
clear to see. Moreover, the argument that Britain was seeking to enter the EEC in order to
redirect it along quite different lines from those being set out by the ‘Six’ is one that has,
understandably, been given a good deal of credit. 
29 That Britain was seeking to play the role of the Trojan Horse, attempting to enter the EEC
to destroy it  from within – or at  least  to transform it  -  or that it  was trying to nip
European construction in the bud, remains convincing. Macmillan, for example, told the
Cabinet in 1961 that the creation of the EEC was “a threat to the political position of the
United Kingdom as a world Power” and that it would be “consistent with our traditional policy to
seek to prevent the concentration of undue strength in a single political unit on the continent of
Europe.”28 As such it remains hard to see Macmillan and other apparently pro-European
voices in any other light than a Eurosceptic one. As is so often the case in the European
debate this comes back to what precisely we mean by ‘Europe’. What is clear is that the
vision held by those in Britain seeking to enter the EEC was often quite different from the
prevailing view within the greater part of the continental elites.
30 Evidence  of  Euroscepticism  was  found  across  the  United  Kingdom  although  in  a
significantly different manner from the situation in 2016. Whereas today the EU is seen
by most SNP and Plaid Cymru supporters as an opportunity to promote their causes in the
1970s this was far from being the case. Instead the EEC was presented as inimical to self-
government, dangerous to the particular economic interests of Scotland and Wales in
areas such as agriculture and fishing and as undemocratic and centralised. Opposition to
the EEC was stronger in Scotland than elsewhere in the UK and one poll in 1971 suggested
that 81% of Scots were opposed to EEC membership. The official SNP line reflected this
Eurosceptic mood in the country and it openly condemned the ‘English Parties’, Labour
and the Conservatives, for seeking to force the Scots into a European grouping against
their will.  In the 1975 referendum the ‘No’ vote for the UK as a whole was 32.8%. In
England it was 31.3% and in Scotland 41.6%.
31 The  campaign  leading  up  to  the  1975  referendum  brought  together  a  wide-ranging
collection of Eurosceptic voices in the cross-party National Referendum Campaign. Its
founding members were Douglas  Jay and the Conservatives  Neil  Marten and Richard
Body. It also drew on support from the SNP and Plaid Cymru, the Ulster Unionists and
from a small number of free trade Liberals. Overall its support came from the left-wing of
the Labour Party and the right wing of the Conservatives. Leading Labour figures who
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gave their support included Tony Benn, Peter Shore, Barbara Castle and Michael Foot.
The trade union leaders Hugh Scanlon and Jack Jones joined them. Bringing together such
diverse leaders as Tony Benn and Enoch Powell was never going to be easy. The group
was marked by its lack of overall unity and often campaigned from quite different, and
sometimes mutually contradictory, angles.  Its ultimate failure was beyond doubt.  The
vote in the House of Commons on the renegotiated terms in April 1975 was unambiguous
with 398 voting in favour and 172 against. Only eight Conservatives voted against with
eighteen others abstaining. The vast majority of opponents were found among the ranks
of the Labour MPs with 145 voting against. The referendum vote was equally clear-cut
with a two-thirds majority voting in favour.
 
Conclusion
32 Looking at the record of early British Euroscepticism it is easy to identify certain themes
that  have been at  the  heart  of  the  campaign to  see  Britain adopt  a  more distanced
position from Europe and from its integrated political institutions. For the more radical
Eurosceptics,  and  for  out  and  out  Europhobes,  this  became  not  just  a  question  of
distancing Britain from the Continent but of breaking away from it or, as they saw it, of
breaking  free.  Although  they  failed  in  the  1975  referendum,  one  of  the  significant
successes of those who supported the Eurosceptic cause from the 1960s onwards was their
ability to increasingly set the agenda and fix the terms of the European debate in Britain
as a whole. This was reinforced by the tendency, especially visible in the approach of the
Labour Party leadership in the 1950s, 60s and 70s, to use the European question as a
political football, as a means of scoring short-term electoral points at the expense of their
political opponents. 
33 Scepticism towards Europe and the various institutions that have, since the end of the
Second World War, constituted the increasingly integrated Europe as it exists today, has
taken numerous different forms and its impact on British policy has varied over time. The
depth of Eurosceptic sentiment depends very much on what Europe we are addressing.
Nor is Europe, and its institutions, fixed but rather a constantly evolving idea and set of
structures  and  organisations.  Euroscepticism  also  came  from  different  ideological
starting  points  and focused on differing  elements  of  what,  taken together,  make up
Europe. It also ranged in intensity, from a mild form of pragmatic doubt or lack of faith in
the  European  ideal  and  in  the  various  ways  this  was  being  put  into  effect,  to  the
unwavering and essential opposition coming from figures such as Enoch Powell and Tony
Benn. Across the wide spectrum of Eurosceptic groups, Europe has been presented as a
problem to be solved rather than as an opportunity to be seized; as at best an unwelcome
development that they would have liked to see go away and at worst as a challenge to be
resisted, often in Saint George like mode; the EEC/EU regarded as the latest in a long list
of threats that Britain has had to face over the course of its history. As Anthony Forster
has argued, “the Euroscepticism which emerged following the Bruges speech has a long lineage…”.
29 and many of the concerns and arguments presented by the recent ‘Leave’ campaign
need to be traced back several decades.
34 Richard Davis is Professor of British Civilisation at the University of Bordeaux-
Montaigne where he teaches contemporary British history and politics. He holds a
BSc(Econ.) from the London School of Economics in international relations, a PhD
from the University of Sheffield in international history and agrégation in English.
Euroscepticism and Opposition to British Entry into the EEC, 1955-75
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXII-2 | 2017
12
His is  the author of  several  books and articles on British foreign policy in the
twentieth century. His latest work is Britain in Crisis (1970-1979) published by the
Presses Universitaires de France in 2016.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Benn, Tony, Conflicts of Interest. Diaries 1977-80 (London, Hutchinson, 1990).
Black, Jeremy, Convergence or Divergence? Britain and the Continent (London, Palgrave, 1994).
Bogdanor, Vernon, ‘Learning from History? The 1975 Referendum on Europe’, Gresham College
Lecture, 23 May 2016 (http://www.gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-events/learning-from-history-
the-1975-referendum-on-europe). 
Forster, Anthony, Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics. Opposition to Europe in the British
Conservative and Labour Parties Since 1945 (London and New York, Routledge, 2002).
Griffiths, Richard T. and Ward, Stuart, Courting the Common Market. The First Attempt to Enlarge the
European Community 1961-1963 (London, Lothian Foundation Press, 1996).
Hennessy, Peter, The Prime Minister. The Office and its Holders Since 1945 (London, Penguin, 2001).
Holmes, Martin (ed.), The Eurosceptical Reader (Basingstoke, Palgrave-Macmillan, 1996).
Lieber, Robert J., British Politics and European Unity: Parties, Elites and Pressure Groups (Berkeley,
California University Press, 1970).
Macmillan, Harold, At the End of the Day, 1961-1963 (London, Macmillan, 1973).
Simms, Brendan, Britain’s Europe. A Thousand Years of Conflict and Cooperation (London, Allen Lane,
2016).
Young, Hugo, This Blessed Plot (London, Macmillan, 1998).
NOTES
1. See Anthony Forster, Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics.  Opposition to Europe in the
British Conservative and Labour Parties Since 1945 (London, 2002), p. 2.
2. See Ibid., ‘Chapter 1: Defining and explaining Euroscepticism’.
3. Tony  Benn  to  the  House  of  Commons, 20  November  1991,  Hansard,  Column 335  (http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199192/cmhansrd/1991-11-20/Debate-6.html).
4. H.A.L. Fisher, History of Europe (London, 1935).
5. G.M. Trevelyan, History of England (London, 1926).
6. See Linda Colley, Acts of Union and Disunion (London, 2014), Chapter 14 ‘Constitutions’.
7. Vernon Bogdanor, Gresham College Lecture, ‘Learning from History? The 1975 Referendum on
Europe’,  23  May  2016  (http://www.gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-events/learning-from-history-
the-1975-referendum-on-europe).
8. Kessing’s Contemporary Archives, Vol. 14 (1963-64) p. 19197.
9. Brendan Simms, Britain’s Europe (London, 2016) p. 179.
Euroscepticism and Opposition to British Entry into the EEC, 1955-75
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXII-2 | 2017
13
10. Survey conducted for New Society quoted in Robert J. Lieber, British Politics and European Unity:
Parties, Elites and Pressure Groups (Berkeley, 1970) p. 259.
11. Brendan Simms, Britain’s Europe, p. 170.
12. Ibid., p. 181.
13. Anthony Forster, Euroscepticism, pp. 13-14.
14. Edward Heath, The Course of My Life (London, 1988) p. 355.
15. Vernon Bogdanor, ‘The 1975 Referendum’.
16. Jeremy Black, Convergence or Divergence? Britain and the Continent (London, 1994) p. 236.
17. Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot (London, 1998) p. 157.
18. Vernon Bogdanor, ‘The 1975 Referendum’.
19. Martin Holmes (ed.), The Eurosceptical Reader (Basingstoke, 1996), p. 1.
20. Ibid, pp. 13-37.
21. Ibid., pp. 13-37.
22. Ibid., pp. 13-37.
23. Public Record Office, PREM 13/306. Note by Michael Stewart for Harold Wilson, 3 March 1965.
24. Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister. The Office and its Holders Since 1945 (London, 2001) p. 365.
25. Ibid., pp. 365-66.
26. Tony Benn, Conflicts of Interest. Diaries 1977-80 (London, 1990).
27. Harold Macmillan, At the End of the Day, 1961-1963 (London, 1973) p  5 and p. 19.
28. Richard T. Griffiths and Stuart Ward, Courting the Common Market. The First Attempt to Enlarge
the European Community 1961-1963 (London, 1996) p. 7. 
29. Anthony Forster, Euroscepticism, pp. 2-3.
ABSTRACTS
While British Euroscepticism is frequently regarded as a phenomenon of the 1980s and 1990s and
is  most  often  seen  in  relation  to  the  Conservative  Party  and  the  Thatcher  and  Major
governments,  particularly  in  the  years  leading  up  to  and  immediately  after  the  Maastricht
Treaty, the key ideas that are associated with it could already be found in the debates around
Britain’s place in Europe in the previous decades.
From the earliest years of European integration with the ECSC in 1950 the refusal to be part of
this process was almost unanimously supported in Britain. The multiple arguments behind this
choice included many that would today be termed ‘Eurosceptic’. In 1961, as a result of the change
of direction announced by the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, and the opening of talks with
the ‘Six’ about a possible British entry into the EEC, the European question assumed a central
place  in  British  political  life.  The  ‘anti-marketeers’  mobilised  support  across  the  political
spectrum, somewhat less among the ranks of the Conservatives, far more in the Labour Party. 
From both the left (Tony Benn) and the right (Enoch Powell),  and at times drawing on quite
different arguments, the campaign against the EEC during the 1975 referendum was unable to
win over a  majority of  public  opinion.  Nonetheless,  the supporters  of  this  first  attempt at  a
“Brexit” did succeed in placing the European question, and that of Britain’s place in Europe, at
the centre of both the national political debate and of the ideological and political struggles that
were tearing apart the Labour and Conservative Parties. The clashes between rival factions in the
two parties in large part revolved around this question of Europe. One consequence of this was
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that  the  ‘anti-marketeers’  of  these  years  established  the  ideological  and  organisational
foundations for the following generation of Eurosceptics. 
Si  l’Euroscepticisme en Grande-Bretagne est  d’habitude considéré comme un phénomène des
années 1980 et 1990, et vu par rapport au parti conservateur et aux gouvernements de Margaret
Thatcher  et  de  John Major,  surtout  à  l’époque du Traité  de  Maastricht,  les  idées  qui  y  sont
associées se trouvaient déjà dans les débats sur la place de la Grande-Bretagne en Europe dans les
années 1950, 60 et 70.
Au début de l’intégration européenne à partir de la création de la CECA en 1950, le refus d’y
participer  était  quasi-unanime  en  Grande-Bretagne  et  cela  pour  de  nombreuses  raisons,  y
compris celles que nous appellerons aujourd’hui ‘eurosceptiques’. En 1961, avec le changement
de cap annoncé par le Premier ministre Harold Macmillan et la décision d’ouvrir les négociations
avec les ‘Six’ sur une éventuelle adhésion de la Grande-Bretagne au Marché commun, la question
européenne a assumé une place de première importance dans la vie politique britannique. La
question  brûlante  de  l’Europe  a  mobilisé  les  opposants  à  l’Europe  de  la  C.E.E.,  les  « anti-
marketeers », qui trouvaient un soutien, dans une moindre mesure, chez certains Conservateurs
et, surtout, dans le parti travailliste. 
Venant de la gauche (Tony Benn) et de la droite (Enoch Powell), et avec parfois des arguments
très différents, la campagne contre la C.E.E. lors du référendum de 1975 n’a pas réussi à réunir
une majorité de l’opinion publique. Néanmoins, les partisans de cette première tentative d’un
Brexit ont réussi à mettre la question de l’Europe, et de la place de la Grande-Bretagne en Europe,
au centre du débat politique national et au cœur des combats idéologiques et politiques au sein
du  parti  conservateur  comme  du  parti  travailliste.  La  lutte  de  pouvoir  entre  les  différentes
factions dans ces deux partis tournait en grande partie autour de cette question de l’Europe. En
cela, les ‘Anti-Marketeers’ des années 1970 ont posé des bases organisationnelles et idéologiques
pour les Eurosceptiques de la génération suivante. 
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